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Georg Meggle / Maria Ulkan
INFORMATIVES AND/OR DIRECTIVES?
(A NEW START IN SPEECH ACT CLASSIFICATION)
Summary
Any classification of illocutionary acts to be well-founded has to be based on logical
principles characteristic of the different kinds of these acts; and the relevant principles have
to be couched in terms of general action theory. This approach is specified for informatives
and directives, and the essential connections between these two (most basic?) types of
illocutionary acts are explicated and diagrammed - showing some primacy of the former.
Discussion, of why in talking about communicative acts some divergence from ordinary
language is to be recommended. Plea for starting speech act classification anew - of course,
using better means.
In order to avoid being thoroughly ad hoc, any classification has to be principled - which holds
with classifying (types of) illocutionary acts in particular. As a theory of illocutionary acts is best
seen to be a special branch of action theory in general, it seems to be clear where the relevant
classification-principles have to come from. (i) It is a general theory of action, in terms of which
(basic) illocutionary acts are to be explicated; and, in order to be reliable, (ii) the needed
classification-principles have to be derived from (the logical connections existing between) these
action-theoretic explications themselves. Now, although much lip-service has been paid to (i),
until quite recently virtually nothing has been done about working it out systematically. (The
logic of illocutionary acts as given in Vanderveken (1991) is not formulated in action theoretical
terms; therefore it is not an alternative to the approach sketched in this paper.) Consequently, the
same holds true with the state of the art of task (ii). Thus, one has to make a new start. (For a first
sketch of the theoretical background used her, see Meggle (1997a).)
Of course, proceeding via the lines of (i) and (ii) cannot take the form of a broad attack seeking
to conquer all the members of the huge 'class of illocutionary acts' (As up to now there is no
adequate explication of "illocutionary act" general enough to cover even such
non-communicative acts as 'christening' at one blow. (To take just one of Austin's speech-act
favourites), this 'class' is not yet well-defined. It is exactly for this reason that we prefer to talk of
communicative acts as characterized in 1 and 2 below.) Instead, we shall try to aim at what is
taken by us to be the centre of the whole continent or - as the classification in question will be
hierarchical in any case – perhaps more to the point, at what we think to be the highest peaks (or
peak?) of the whole area. Following Schiffer (1972), IV.2, we take it that (iii) informative and
directive speech acts are the most general ones under which all the other communicative acts
may be subsumed. In accepting Schiffer's (iii), we are opposing Searle's (1975) system of five
classes of basic illocutionary acts; Searle's system criticised in Ballmer (1979) - but there not
refuted, as shown in Ulkan (1992). In Schiffer, op.cit., our 'informatives' are called 'assertives';
but as with the latter term association with ordinary assertions might be unavoidable (by which
In: E. Rolf (Hg.), Pragmatik. Implikaturen und Sprechakte, Linguistische Berichte, Sonderheft 8, Opladen
1997, S. 214-225.
2
our stressing of the more abstract nature of the type of communicative acts we have in mind
would be cancelled), we prefer - in analogy to 'directives' - the more technical former one.
But, whereas Schiffer merely contends that the resulting system of two classes can't be further
reduced, this is exactly the point to be called into question in this paper. (Notice, that in the
following nothing depends on whether (iii) will in fact be accepted or not. The question of how
informatives and directives are interrelated remains to be answered anyhow.)
1. Informal characterization. Communicative acts are acts directed to other persons
(addressees), produced with the primary intention of making the respective adressee either do
something or acquire a certain propositional attitude. Communicative acts, when done with the
primary intention that A is to do something, we call directives (short for 'directive
communicative acts'), when done with the primary intention that A is to believe something,
informatives. The very interesting questions of whether there are communicative acts with the
primary intention that A is to want something (more general: that A is to acquire some
preference), and, if affirmative, of whether their type, too, should be regarded as basic, belong to
the many questions to be left unsettled here due to limitations of space. Proposals as to how this
third type may be dubbed are welcome: meggle@uni-leipzig.de.
Primary intentions do not suffice to make an act a communicative one. But the essential further
feature of communicative acts is not very hard to get at. It relates to how the speaker believes he
achieves his primary aim: In communicative acts the speaker believes he achieves his primary
aim iff his act is understood by his audience A to be a communicative one done with the primary
intention in question. (Worth noting that 'speaker' is used here (as it is common practice in the
literature) in the wide sense of 'communicator'. Thus, neither reference to phonetic nor even to
auditive utterances is implied.) Now, although this characterization is obviously circular, it gives
us at least a criterion of adequacy for any non-circular explication. And it follows from it that,
for an act to be a communicative one, the speaker S must not only intend A to recognize his
primary intention, but also to recognize all the relevant communicative intentions, e.g., that A is
to recognize S's primary intention, etc.
This first extremely rough characterization exploits Grice's (1957) definition of utterer's meaning
which was shown in Schiffer (1972) not to fulfil our stated criterion of adequacy. Now, it should
be clear that the problem of explicating communicative acts non-circularly is not a trivial one,
and that some logical machinery has to be used in order to keep all the different things involved
in reflexive intentions really distinct. In formal action-theoretic terms the explication problem
was solved in Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation - in the following referred to as GBK. As in
elucidating the conceptual connections between informatives and directives we need some part of
this machinery, a simplified version of the GBK-explication will be presented in the next §. (The
main simplification consists in omitting a particular operator for conditionals, which already
would have to come in to strengthen the equivalence contained in B(X,p ≡ D(X,f)), thus making
D1 more adequate.)
For his belief that A will recognize the relevant communicative intentions of his act S may have
any reasons whatever. (Which is, of course, not to deny that in normal cases these reasons will be
quite specific ones as including supposed common knowledge of linguistic and other
conventions.) But, as none of these possible reasons is essentially connected with informatives
and directives, there is no need to specify them at this stage. And, in fact, if our considerations
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are to be really general, they should not be specified either. (Doing this would already engage us
in some kind of further sub-classification, which is another story - to be told elsewhere.)
2.1 Preliminaries of formal explication. As communicative acts are a special kind of intentional
acts, the latter term is to be explicated first. Writing D(X,f) for 'At time t person X does (act of
type) f’, B(X,p) for 'At t X (strongly) believes that p' and W(X,p) for 'At t X wants that p', the
relevant concept of intention can (restricting our considerations to situations of decision under
certainty) easily be given as follows (As we are treating all referring expressions occurring in the
following intensional contexts as standard names, the problem of the distinction between de re
vs. de dicto readings does not arise. For corresponding widenings see GBK, § 8. The logical
principles regulating our use of the terms mentioned in the definiens of D1 as well as some
principles connecting beliefs/wants ascribed to a particular person at different times are also
mentioned or specified in GBK.):
D1: I(X,f,p) : = D(X,f) & W(X,p) & B(X,p ≡ D(X,f))
At t X does f with the intention to bring about p iff, at t, X does f, wants that p, and
believes that p (will be the case) iff she (X) does f
Clearly, in I(X,f,p) the proposition expressed by p has to be such that X believes it to be realized
at time t', where t' is (usually immediately) following t. When talking about doings, beliefs and
wants at t', we shall make this time-reference explicit by writing D',B' and W’.
Now, in order to get at the logical structure of our basic communicative acts (or act?), two further
highly specific intention-concepts are needed. The first is the Gricean concept of an M-intention
as used by him in the definiens of his (1957)-explication for utterer's meaning, to be improved
and made more precise as follows - with K(X,p), for 'X knows that p', as short for B(X,p) & p,
i.e.: X believes that p, and it is the case that p:
D2.1: MI(X,Y,f,r) : = I(X,f,D'(Y,r)) &
  B(X,D'(Y,r) ≡ K'(Y,I(X,f,D'(Y,r))))
At t X does f with the M-intention that Y is, at t', to do r iff X does, at t, f with the 
(primary) intention to bring it about that, at t', Y is to do r, and S believes at t, that Y will, 
at t', do r if and only if S's primary intention will be recognized (known) by Y at t'.
In Grice's own formulations the second condition of D2.1 contains ‘S intends' instead of 'S
believes'. But this is surely inadequate, as the truth of the embedded equivalence will not be
brought about by S's doing of f. The further condition I(S,f,B'(A,I(S,f,D'(A,r)))) mentioned by
Grice - of course, in ordinary language terms only - follows already from the definiens of D2.1;
therefore, although in itself necessary, it need not be mentioned explicitly. With the help of the
epistemic principle B(X,p) ≡ B(X,B(X,p)) and of the principle (∗∗) W(X,p) ≡ B(X,W(X,p)), the
reader will be able to verify that the first condition of D2.1 (or D2.2) may be even reduced to
D(S,f), the other conditions of I(S,f,D'(A,r)) (or I(S,f,B'(A, p))) being entailed by D(S,f) in
conjunction with the respective second condition. The same holds with the conditions mentioned
in (∗) in 2.2 as well.
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For M-intentions with the primary aim that Y is to believe that p, we can stipulate
correspondingly:
D2.2: MI(X,Y,f,p) : = I(X,f,B'(Y,p))  &
B(X,B'(Y,p) ≡ K'(Y,I(X,f,B'(Y,p))))
At t X does f with the M-intention that Y is, at t', to believe that p
There is another concept, not contained in Grice's proposa1, but necessary to make this very
proposal adequate. It relates to the fact that in communication all the relevant communicative
intentions must be intended by the speaker for his addressee to be quite out in the open. More
generally defined (with ∀n as short for ‘For all n’):
D3: (a) I1(X,Y,f,p) : = I(X,f,B'(Y,p))
(b) In+l(X,Y,f,p) : = I1(X,Y,f,In(X,Y,f,p))
(c) I* (X,y,f,p) = ∀nIn(X,Y,f,p)
That Y is to believe that p, is intended by X's doing of f in a way 
(intended by X) to be absolutely out in the open for Y
Note, that by I* (X,Y,f,p) it is not implied that X himself is believing that p.
2.2 Informatives and Directives / Explications. Now, our criterion of adequacy for any definition
of communicative acts can, for directives, be stated as follows. (The reader is asked to transform
itinto the corresponding criterion for informatives by himself. The structures of both of these
criteria may be compared with the structures of the definiens of D2.1 and D2.2.) That an act of
type f produced by S at t is a directive communicative act with the primary intention that A is to
do r, will be represented by the symbol CAd(S,A, f,r); correspondingly, we write CAi(S,A,f,p) for
an informative primarily intending A to believe that p. (Of course, as the kind of primary
intentions in question is already determined by referring to r (action) or p (proposition),
respectively, the indices d and i in CAd(S,A,f,r) and CAi(S,A,f,p) are superfluous. But not so,
when we are generalizing by abstracting from r and p, thus coming to CAd(S,A,f) : =
Vr(CAd(S,A,f,r)) and CAi(S,A,f) : = Vp(CAi(S,A,f,p)).)
(*) CAd(S,A,f,r) ≡ I(S,f'D'(A,r)) &
B(S,D'(A,r) ≡ K'(H,CAd(S,A,f,r)))
As already proved in GBK, criterion (*) and its analogue for informatives are fulfilled by
defining directives and informatives in the following way (thus proved to be adequate):
D4.1: CAd(S,A,f;r) : = MI(S,A,f,r) &
I*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))
D4.2: CAi(S,A,f,p) : = MI(S,A,f,p) &
I*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p))
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So much for the logical structure of our two central communicative acts. As, in the end, they are
defined exclusively by means of our three action theoretic concepts D(X,f), B(X,p) and W(X,p)
in application only to speaker S, it should be clear that neither CAd(S,A,f,r) nor CAi(S,A,f,p)
entail anything about whether the respective communicative act is in fact understood by A, or
anything about whether A really does or believes what he is primarily intended to do or to
believe; i.e.: our communicatives are communicative acts in the wide sense of communication
attempts - these attempts being successful (communicative acts in a stronger sense) or not.
Unfortunately, in what is usually taken to be a theory of speech acts this fundamental distinction
between communicatives in a weak and in a strong sense is being systematically neglected. (In
the rare cases where illocutionary act is in fact tried to be explained, addressee's understanding
('uptake') is following Austin (1962) - already regarded to be a necessary condition. For further
criticism of this and related paints see Meggle (HTS), I.4, and Ulkan (1992).
3. Logical connections. A principled classification of communicative acts to be really worth its
name has to be based on the logical structure of the acts to be classified. Now, having arrived at
this structure for our two candidates, let's consider how these candidates are correlated. Then, the
resulting logical connections will give us immediately the relevant classification principles which
are to be discussed next.
Any directive is an informative, too, as shown by the following theorem ((1) and (5) correspond
to the theorems T.K67.1 and T.K70 of GBK, proved in its appendix. The restriction needed for
the soundness of (α) is formulated in T.K72 as presented and proved in Meggle (HTS), by means
of which, in connection with (1), (2) to (4) can easily be shown to be valid.):
(1 ) CAd(S,A,f,r) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f,CAd(S,A,f,r))
And, although the sentence
(α) p ⊃ q ├ CAi(S,A,f,p) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f,q), for any S and A
does not state a principle generally valid in communication-logic, it can be proved to be valid,
when restricted to cases where (a) S believes that A will come to believe that q only via S's doing
of f, and (b) S believes (a) to be, or to become, mutually known by himself and A. (For a precise
statement of the conditions of mutual knowledge see Meggle (1993).) Now, this condition being
clearly fulfilled at least with respect both to I* (S,A,f, MI(S,A,f,r)) and MI(S,A,f,r) and
I(S,f,D'(A,r)), at least the following principles can be derived from (1):
(2) CAd(S,A,f,r) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f',I*(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)))
(3) CAd(S,A,f,r) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) and
(4) CAd(S,A,f,r) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f,I(S,f,D'(A,r))).
Further, as may be proved by generalization for any of these principles, it is analytically true that
(5) CAd(S,A,f) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f)
Any directive is an informative, too.
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The reason why we are stressing the too should be obvious. That directives are informatives, too,
is not to deny that there are important differences between them. By saying that an act f produced
by S at t is a directive, we are implying that S's primary communicative intention is that A is to
do something, by saying that the act in question is an informative, that S's primary
communicative intention is that A is to believe something. But this essential difference is not
being cancelled by (5) and its more specific corollaries. Of none of the five theorems the
converse holds without further qualification. Thus, to take just (4), it would be utterly false to
regard a directive with the primary intention that A is to do r as being the same as an informative
with the primary intention that A is to believe that S has this very intention - as proposed, e.g., by
Armstrong (1971) and rightly rejected in Bennett (1976), § 41, p.134: "The crucial objection is
that [Armstrong's] account of injunction-meaning obliterates the distinction between S's telling A
to do r and S's merely informing A that S favours A's doing r. It is no defence to say that one can
tell someone to do r by informing him that one wants him to do r; that is not in dispute. My point
is that one can seek just to inform someone that one favours his doing r, not aiming to tell or
advise or request or recommend him to do r; but on Armstrong's account this is impossible, for if
you tell the person that you favour [intend] his doing r then you have ipso facto fulfilled
Armstrong's conditions for telling him to do r. In short, in Armstrong's account the whole essence
of injunctions, as of statements, is informative." To make our position clear once more: It is - cf.
(5) - in fact part of the essence of directives to be informative, too, but this is not their whole
essence.) And the same verdict would have to be reached with respect to accepting the converse
of the stronger theorems (1) to (3). (For a prima facie argument to the contrary drawing its
apparent force from ordinary language usage see § 5 below.)
Now, directives making up a special sort of the genus of informatives, the crucial question left to
be answered is this: What feature has to be adjoined to informatives of the kind specified on the
right side of our above theorems in order to get the respective directive expressed on their left
side? As a first shot, one might try to start with (4) and adjoin to its right side I(S,f,D'(A,r)), thus
getting
(β) CAd(S,A,f,r)   ≡   CAi(S,A,f',I(S,f'D'(A,r)))  &  I(S,f,D'(A,r))
The leading idea of this proposal consists in taking directives to be special kinds of informatives
for which in producing them the speaker is sincere.
In general terms: In producing an informative act of kind CAi(S,A,f,p), S is sincere iff p is
believed to be true by S himself. It is not entailed by CAi(S,A,f,p) that B(S,p) is true. For the
question why this entailment should not be generally allowed, see the intuitive discussion in
GBK, 3.1.3. Nevertheless, in normal cases B(S,p) will be true, too. But, intuitive reasons apart,
there is a further theoretic advantage -not yet noted in GBK, but heavily enforcing its settlement
of this problem - of B(S,p) not being involved in CAi(S,A,f,p): Not taking this position would
preclude any possibility of distinguishing between CAd(S,A,f,r) and the wider concept of
directives mentioned in § 5 below.
But, although the idea of taking directives to be sincere informatives is absolutely correct, its
realization in (β) is not the one needed to make (β) true. For its right side does not entail that (a)
S believes that A will do r iff it is recognized by A that he is to do r - which is, as stated already
by Grice (1957), a necessary condition for CAd(S,A,f,r). But substituting MI(S,A,f,r) for
I(S,A,D'(A,r)) wouldn't do either. For it is not entailed by the resulting new right side of (β) that
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S believes it to be known by A that (a) - which is a further necessary condition for CAd(S,A,f,r)
following from our informal characterization of communicative acts in § 1 and, accordingly,
derivable from our adequacy criterion (*) in 2.2.
Thus, we have to look for some stronger alternatives. To preclude having to enter into too much
discussion, let us jump just to the right one. It follows already from our definitions D4.1 and
D4.2 that:
(6) CAd(S,A,f,r) ≡ CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) & MI(S,A,f,r)
Directives primarily intending that A is to do r are (analytically equivalent with) informatives
primarily intending that A is to recognize that S M-intends A to do r, i.e., informatives primarily
intending that A is to believe that MI(S,A,f,r) and such that S is sincere. Strictly speaking,
sincerity of CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) entails just B(S,MI(S,A,f,r)). But as it is generally true that
(∗∗) W(X,p) ≡ B(X,W(X,p)), it is also (cf. lemma L.15 of GBK) generally true that (7)
MI(S,A,f,r) ≡ D(S,f) & B(S,MI(S,A,f,r))). And thus, as D(S,f) is already entailed by CAi(S,A,f),
sincerity of CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) entails MI(S,A,f,r) as well.
Thus, instead of defining in the beginning both informatives and directives, we might have
started with informatives alone, directives then being defined as special (sincere) informatives in
the form arrived at by (6). And, as the converse procedure is not possible, this is enough to claim
the primacy of informatives over directives to be fully justified. And thus, as we are accepting
Schiffer’s thesis (iii), stated in our introductory remarks, we may say that there is indeed just one
peak which is the highest one in the wide area of communicative acts. Informatives constitute the
only class under which all the other communicative acts can be subsumed. There is just one basic
type of communicative acts.
The analogue of (6) holds for informatives as well:
(8) CAi(S,A,f,p) ≡ CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p)) & MI(S,A,f,p)
Informatives primarily intending that A is to believe that p are (analytically equivalent with)
informatives primarily intending that A is to recognize that S M-intends A to believe that p, i.e.,
informatives primarily intending that A is to believe that MI(S,A,f,p) and such that S is sincere.
4. Beginning of principled classification. Taking (6) and (8) together, one can see that both
CAd(S,A,f,r) and CAi(S,A,f,p) can be considered to be special cases of (sincere) informatives
with the primary intention that A is to believe that S's doing of f is connected with some M-
intention directed at A. Thus, starting with the idea that communicative acts are acts involving
reflexive intentions, we obtain the general classification schema figure 1. (P[ϕ,A] is to stand for a
sentence-schema containing "A" as referring to A and "ϕ" as expressing the quality ϕ of A, ϕ
being either the quality of doing some action or the quality of believing something to be true.
Where the intention represented by I(S,f,P’[ϕ, A]) is also a M-intention, we use the abbreviation
MI(S,f,P'[ϕ, A]) accordingly. (Of course, P’[ϕ,A] is not allowed to be equivalent with a sentence not
essentially containing "A" and "ϕ", as is the case, e.g., in p & (ϕ(A) v ¬ϕ(A)).))




II: I(S,f,B'(A,MI(S,f,P’[ϕ, A]))  ¬I(S,f,B'(A,MI(S,f,P’[ϕ, A]))
III: CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,f,P’[ϕ, A])) ¬CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,f',P’[ϕ, A]))
IV: CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p))
V: CAd(S,A,f,r) ¬CAd(S,A,f.r) CAi(S,A.f,p) ¬CAi(S,A,f,p)
Figure 1
By step I and II communicative acts are imbedded into the frame of intentional acts of a
particular kind; and after III the informatives of the represented kind is split up for some action or
some belief of A, respectively. That step I is true, but also the right side of II, may be the case, if,
for example, S does not believe that it is known by A that (a) S believes that P’[ϕ, A] will be true
iff it is recognized by A that I(S,f,P’[ϕ, A]). And that the left side of II is true, but also the right one
of III, this may be the case, if, e.g., it is not believed by S that it is mutual knowledge between S
and A that (a). (For an example, where CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)), but not CAd(S,A, f,r), see 5.2
below.) Each entry on the left side of a branching entails the upper entry of which it is a branch;
and each branching entry entails the alternative of its branches.
5. Informatives and directives in ordinary language. Informatives and directives as defined in
D4.1 and D4.2 are acts of a more abstract kind than ordinary language seems to be equipped
with. Now, although the primary justification of these notions consists in their systematic
fruitfulness, nevertheless it may be questioned whether we have got at the right notions for even
the paradigm cases of ordinary informatives and directives to be able to be subsumed. The
adequacy of starting with reflexive intentions of some kind already taken for granted, there are
mainly two arguments by which our approach may be called into question; let us consider them
separately.
5.1 The informative/directive dichotomy. Ordinary language seems to contain the presupposition
that a communicative act is either a directive or an informative, but never both - in clear
opposition to our definitions by which, as already stated in 3 above, it follows that
(4) CAd(S,A,f,r) ⊃ CAi(S,A,f,I(S,f,D'(A,r)))
Now, although this does not mean (cf. 3) that directives are to be simply equated with
informatives, our very thesis that directives are informatives, too, seems to be at variance with
ordinary language, which, in Bennett's words, seeks to keep "the distinction between statements
and injunctions ... deep and secure"; op. cit., p.135.
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But this reliance on ordinary language does not make up a real objection to our more technical
notions. As already noticed by Bennett himself (op. cit., 135), the informatives following from
CAd(S,A,f,r) are always such that they are about "a proposition about S's state of mind, which S
seeks to communicate mainly or wholly because he thinks it is a means to achieving, through the
Gricean mechanism [modified by us in D4.1 and D4.2], some other effect", in the case of
CAd(S,A,f,r) this other effect being D’(A,r). Now, when asked of what particular kind a
particular communicative act is or, what on our general level would amount to the same, of what
kind the primary communicative intention of the act in question is, it would be utterly
misleading, if this question would be answered only with reference to one of the weaker
communicative intentions, which are involved in the communicative act, too. In ordinary
language the informative/directive distinction is exclusively connected with what the strongest
communicative intentions of the action to be classified as such and such are. Not so in our more
general approach. But as this approach may be brought in accordance with ordinary usage by
means of the very distinction between stronger and weaker communicative intentions, nothing is
lost. And that very much is to be gained by approaching communicative acts in our more general
terms, seems to be clear enough. Finally it should be noticed that for CAd(S,A,f,r) and
CAi(S,A,f,p), where p is not a proposition of the kind drawn attention to by Bennett, the
distinction between these acts is as "deep and secure" as before. (In figure 1, both are represented
at stage V; but both are to be subsumed under informatives of kind IV.)
5.2 Informatives and directives in a wider sense. That our concepts of informatives and
directives may also diverge from ordinary language usage in another respect was hinted at by
Alston's (1964, 41) remark that for an act to be of illocutionary type T it need not be a sincere
illocutionary act of type T. To borrow his example: Even if I know perfectly well that a certain
door is already open, when saying to you 'Please open the door' I may nevertheless be said to be
asking you to open the door, Thus, as asking you to do r does not imply that I do really intend
you to do r, and asking someone to do something being clearly a special case of directives, it
follows that directives don't generally involve the primary intention attributed to them by our
definition D4.1. And the same argument may be brought forward as far as informatives are
concerned.
Let us just concentrate on the essential moral of this intricate argument: Whereas in our approach
sincerity of CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r)) or CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p)) is necessary for having a case of
CAd(S,A,f,r) or CAi(S,A,f,p), respectively, this sincerity condition is not generally required in
ordinary language according to which an act may be classified as a directive° (i.e., as a directive
in the sense of ordinary language) or as an informative° iff S intends his act to be taken to be a
directive or an informative (in our strict senses). Accordingly, explication of communicative acts
in this wider sense is easy:
D5.1: CA°d(S,A,f,r)  : = I(S,f,B'(A,CAd(S,A,f,r)))
D5.2 CA°i(S,A,f,p)  : = I(S,f,B'(A,CAi(S,A,f,p)))
To give these directives° and informatives° their respective place in our figure 1 classification is
no problem at all, as the following two statements hold analvtically ((9) follows directly from the
theorems T.K74 and T.K75 proved in Meggle (HTS); the general truth of (10) is to be shown
easily by analogy.):
(9) CA°d(S,A,f,r)  ≡ CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,r))
(10) CA°i(S,A,f,p)  ≡ CAi(S,A,f,MI(S,A,f,p))
In: E. Rolf (Hg.), Pragmatik. Implikaturen und Sprechakte, Linguistische Berichte, Sonderheft 8, Opladen
1997, S. 214-225.
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To conclude, informatives° and directives° are exactly the informatives of kind IV (of figure 1),
under which our directives and our CAi(S,A,f,p) informatives are to be subsumed, which is
enough to prove that our general concept of informatives is being presupposed by informatives°
and directives° in the same way as it was by our directives. Thus, this second reference to
ordinary language, too, can by no means lead to a reasonable objection to the primacy of
informatives.
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